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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute.*,] Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction .... 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record ovei which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]*0 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) 
and § 7C-2a-3(2 MJ ). which biutuicb pro\ ide that the Supreme Court may transfer any matter 
over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a party is liable under Utah Code Section 13-36-101, et seq., for 
unsolicited commercial emails it caused to be sent? 
2. Whether a finding that the sender of an unsolicited commercial email is an 
independent contractor to a party causing the email to be sent relieves the pai'ty of liability 
under the statute? 
3. Whether the District Court's judgment should have been altered or amended 
when new information is brought to its attention? 
1
 Utah Const.. Article VIII. § 5. 
2
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3 )(j) (1953. as amended). 
1 
4. Whether the lower court erred b} granting summary judgment without 
permitting an}' discover} to be conducted by the parties and while Appellant was seeking 
discovery under Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(f)'? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the le°"al conch1 ci^^c nf th° trial m^rt 'qin^ thiQ U/£K ?\ 
summary judgment it was resolved in toto upon legal conclusions) for correctness. 
u\jrncrali\. wc ICVJCW a trial court s legal conclusions ior correctness, accoramg tue tiia* 
court no particular deference.'* Wilson Supph, Inc. v. Fradan Mjg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 1L 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orion v. Carter, 9"?0 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for 
correctness. aWe review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness." Davis 
Count} Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful 2002 UT 60. P 9. 52 P.3d 1174. "We look 
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to 
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous.'" Id. ar P 10. w'We analyze the language 
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions v/ithin the same statute or act. and v e 
attempt to harmonize the provisions m accordance with the legislative intent so as to give 
meaning to each provision.'* Id. 
o 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Ut.R.Civ.P 56(f). These are set out in full in the accompanying 
Appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves the sending of unsolicited commercial email by Redmond Venture, 
Inc. (Defeiidani/'Appellee/Redmond) tu Bntincy Fenn (Tlaintiff/Appellant/Fenn). Daniel 
Garriott fPlaintiff/Appellant/Gamott), and Jane Johnson (Plaintiff/Appellant/Johnson) for 
which each brought actions in accordance with the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually 
Explicit Email Act found in Utah Code Annotated §§ 13-36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002) (the 
"Statute"). This is a case of first impression. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Fenn filed her action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on December 3,2002 
alleging that Redmond sent or caused to be sent to Fenn an unsolicited commercial email in 
violation of the Statute. See Fenn Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-6. Garriott and Johnson each 
filed their actions in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on December 17. 2002, also 
alleging that Redmond sent or caused to be sent to each of them an unsolicited commercial 
email m violation of the Statute. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 1-7: Johnson Ct. Rec. p. 1-5. On 
Februan 25.2003. Redmond filed a motion for consolidation pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure in the Fenn matter, arguing that each of the three cases against 
Redmond, including Fenn*s. Garriott" s, and Johnson's, should be consolidated into one 
action. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 13-41. The Honorable Judge Lmdberg granted Redmond's 
motion to consolidate on June 25, 2003. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 105-112. 
On March 25. 2003, before the cases had been consolidated, Redmond filed virtually 
identical motions for summary judgment m each of the three cases. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 42-
72; Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 34-50; Johnson Ct. Rec. p. 11-41. Plaintiffs submitted a combined 
memorandum in opposition TO Redmond^ mciion on April 7, 2003, which was filed in me 
Garriott case. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 56-101. 
On June 25, 2003, without hearing, Judge Lindberg filed her Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she granted Defendant' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Sec Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 105-112 The lower court found that 
although Redmond had contracted with ''promoters" that the promoters should be treated as 
independent contractors and therefore Redmond was not liable for the actions of the 
promoters. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 105-112. 
On July 7, 2003. consolidated Plaintiffs filed a Motion and Memorandum to Alter or 
Amend Judgment Under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and For 
Discovery under Rule 56(fj. to which Plaintiffs attached as exhibits two different ''anti-
spam" policies that had been submitted by Redmond. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 113-122. 
Redmond filed it's opposition memorandum July 23. 2003. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 140-153. 
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On October 20, 2003, without a hearing, the Honorable Judge Lmdberg denied Plaintiffs' 
motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 158-162. 
Plaintiffs filed their consolidated Notice of Appeal November 14,2003 (Fenn Ct. Rec. 
pp. 163-165) with me Utah Supreme Coun which subsequently transferred this matter to this 
Court on January 14. 2004 (Ct. Rec. p. 167). 
Facts Established in the Record Below: 
1. On September 9.2002 Bnttiiey Feim ieccived an unsolicited commercial email. 
See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 88. 
2. On September 7. 2002. Daniel Garriott received an unsolicited commercial 
email. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 58. 
3. On September 8,2002, Jane Johnson received an unsolicited commercial email. 
4. Each of these emails solicited products sold for the benefit of Redmond 
Venture. Inc. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 140. ff 6-8. (Memorandum of the Court) 
5. Neither Brittney Fenn. Daniel Garriott, nor Jane Johnson has ever had a 
commercial or other relationship with Defendant. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 141. f 10. 
6. Redmond hires ''promoters*' to solicit business and sales for its products over 
the internet. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 43. f 11. ("Found in Kavner affidavit). 
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7. Promoters hired by Redmond are paid a percentage of the sales they make. See 
Garriott Ct. Pvec. p. 41 (Kavner Affidavit <][41). 
8. Despite the obvious solicitation of Redmond w7ares. Redmond denies any 
reiauonsmp with the senders of the emails. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 135, T[14. 
9. Redmond alleges that it requires the promoters it hires to adhere to an anti-
spam policy. which the senders of the emails obvioush did not. See Garriott Ct. R.ec. p. 134-
135,^13. 
10. During die course of ihc litigation, Kedmond supplied to Plaintiffs two 
different anti-spam policies. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 151-153 ("Exhibits to Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment}. 
11. One of the anti-spam policies provided by Redmond does not require the 
senders to substantially comply with Utah law, that policy was brought to counsel's attention 
after it's opposition memorandum was already filed. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 151 
(Memorandum m Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment). 
12. The second anti-spam policy prouded by Redmond, and which policy was 
provided as an exhibit to Redmond's Motion for Summar}* Judgment, is much more 
extensive than the first anti-spam policy provided. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 153 (Exhibit to 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment). 
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13. The lower court relied upon the second anti-spam policy, and was not made 
aware of the first until Plaintiffs filed their motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Fenn 
Ct Pvec. p. 113-120 (Exhibit to Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment). 
14. The second anti-spam policy contains an indemnification clause and right to 
sue if the signers of the agreement do not comply with the policy. See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 153 
/ T Z \ ' l ~ i - t l-\-i i~ 1 r\ \ tf S-\+T r\t~i 1 r\ A I f o r r\*t~ A - r v \ o m A. T i \ A r r - rY-k^ i t i t \ 
\ JL_i/U.LJ.ULL I U i V l U L l U U I U n i L L / i U l . . " k l i ^ H ^ J U U ^ l J L i L - U L J . 
15. The lower court relied only upon the affidavit of Gene Kavner, CEO of 
Redmond ^eniures* Inc. See Gannon Ci Rec p 139-1-15 
16. Plaintiffs were never given any opportunity to cross-examine that witness or 
to discover any other facts that might contradict his testimony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Utah statute places responsibility upon those who "cause to be sent" the 
unwanted email. Therefore, the decision that Redmond used another party rather than 
sending unwanted SPAM direct!} does not relieve Redmond of liability under the Utah lav . 
2. There are at least two versions of Redmond's anti-Spam policy. This raises 
question^ of fact as to whether either or both w ere fabrications, and whether either or both 
were followed. In this case, those questions of fact precluded summary judgment. 
3. Granting summan judgment when there are questions of fact and a Plaintiff 
seeking discovery was wrong. The Appellant* s Rule 56( f) motion should have been granted. 
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There remained some issues which required factual testimony and the resolution of facts m 
favor of the non-moving party which prevented summary judgment or which required 
discovery. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The "Spam" Statute Clearly Places Liability on Redmond for Contracting 
for the Promotion of Its Products. 
Utah Code Section 13-36-1 OR ct seq. is known as the Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act. Unsolicited commercial email is common!} known as 
" S P A M . " The actions m mis case were ail brought for alleged violations of that act. Section 
13-26-103 places strict liability upon anyone who "sends or causes to be sent" an unsolicited 
commercial email without following certain requirements of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-36-103 (1953 as amended;. Each of the Plaintiffs/Appellants in this case received an 
email which was not in compliance with the statute. That fact is not in dispute, and is a direct 
finding of the lower court. See Garriott Ct. P e^c. p. 140, f][ 6-8. What is m dispute is whether 
or not the entity that caused the SPAM to be sent should be held responsible for it. as the 
statute requires. The key phrase in the statute is "sends or causes to be sent." There is no 
qualification. If an emit} sends or causes an email to be sen: that violates the statute, they 
are liable. Redmond caused the SPAM to be sent. 
The established facts are that each of the Plaintiffs/Appellants received emails 
soliciting Redmond's products. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 140. ff 6-8. Redmond contracts 
with persons or entities which it labels as "promoters/' who earn money by soliciting 
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Redmond's products. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 141. 1 1 1 . It was from some of those 
promoters that Plaintiffs/Appellants received the complained of emails. See Garriott Ct. Rec. 
p. 1-1(1 W 6-8. In other words, Redmond caused to be sent emails soliciting their products, 
which did not conform with the requirements of the statute. The lower court however has 
failed to enforce that statute. Rather it found that the entities who actually sent the emails 
were '"independent contractors and thereiore Redmond was shielded from all liability 
despite the fact that Redmond caused the independent contractors to send the unwanted 
SPAJVI This is a flawed interpretation of the statute. The statute does not sav "sends or 
causes to be sent, unless sent by an independent contractor." It says sends or causes to be 
sent. Even if Redmond did not directly send the email, it most certainly caused it to be sent. 
The lower court relied upon an established legal theory that relieves a principal from 
the tortious actions of an independent contractor . See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 143-1J-4. ff 25-
27. HoVv ever, in virtually the same paragraph, the lower court stated that it had previously 
determined "that a violation of [the * spam" Act] [does not] rise to the level of a tort within 
the meaning of the long-arm statute[.r See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 14-4, f 26. "Where a statute 
provides a specific civil legal reined}7 to redress an injur}7 m violation of that statute, a tort 
action for violation of the public policy embodied m the statute will not lie." Prince v. Bear 
River Mm. Ins., 2002 UT 6S f 47, 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002). The lower court further stated 
that u[n]o caselaw has been provided to the Court suggesting that principals ma} be held 
liable for acts of independent contractors in situations where no physical harm has resulted. 
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See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 144, footnote 6. Notwithstanding this conviction and determination, 
the court still relied upon tort law to assert that Redmond was not liable for the actions of it's 
independent contractors w7hen there actually, m this case, does exist a civil remedy. See 
Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 144, f 27-28. This is non-sensical, and no explanation is given for the 
lower court' s reasoning to depart from the rule of law it had previously followed. The statute 
is clear, if an entity causes to be sent violating emails, thai entity is liable. Redmond caused, 
admittedly through other entities, violating emails soliciting its wares to be sent. Redmond 
should be found liable under the statute. 
Additionally, the statute places liability on the sender of a nonconforming email when 
it is sent ''either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." U.C.A. § 13-36-103(3). 
Redmond blames their "Promoters of Redv products." Redmond contracted with 
"Promoters" to send Redmond's advertisements. Redmond sent or caused to be sent the 
offending email to be sent by one of their subsidiaries. The chain originates with Redmond, 
and is intended to solicit business to Redmond. Even still, Redmond argues that because they 
were not the ones who pushed the send button, the) should not be held responsible. This was 
not the intent of the legislature. If it were, any company wishing to send SPAM emails 
would simply contract with some bankrupt, judgment-proof company, or even easier still, 
some entity that it maintained as an independent contractor, to send their unsolicited emails. 
The lower court's ruling completely destroys any effectiveness of the statute. It is almost 
impossible to stop those that send the SPAM, but it is not impossible to stop those who 
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contract with senders to send it. This is exactly what the legislature targeted. The statute 
points to the one "who causes it to be sent" (Redmond). See U.C.A. § 13-36-103(1). 
Plaintiffs have never had any form of a relationship with Redmond. Redmond is therefore 
the parry thai is liable under me statute. 
The lower court's ruling fails to construe the meaning of the Statute according to its 
plain language. "A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be 
construed according to their plain language." Ajndtv. First Interstate Bank, 991 P.2d 584, 
J O O lULdii iyyy) ujUuLiii^ u-ivctjt \. uuui jiait i\turemtiu £>u., y jo r.su. ~ / y. _M (uiaii 
1998)) and "where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond 
the statute's plain meaning to divine legislative intent." Norton v. Royal Order of the Swu 
821 P. 2d 1167. 1168 (Utah 1991). Despite giving lip service to these principles, the lower 
court did violence to the Statute's language and twisted its meaning beyond all recognition. 
It's decision not ovAy failed to properly interpret the statute, it undermined the clear 
legislative intention to reach the real party responsible, who causes SPAM to be sent. 
Notwithstanding the lack of caselav , and based entirely upon an un-cross examined, 
self-serving affidavit, the lower court determined that the senders of the emails must have 
been independent contractors of Redmond. Additionally, the lower court found that 
Pvedmond could not be held liable for sending their solicitations because it allegedly has an 
anti-spam policy, which the lower court found to substantially comply with the requirements 
of the spam statute. See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 144-145, f 28-31. This was established by the 
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court based only upon the self serving affidavit of the Defendant's CEO. No evidence w;as 
offered that the pohc\ provided w7as actually ever followed, or "established'" as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105(v4)5 onl} the uncross-examined testimony of the Defendant. 
The simple fact of the matter is that it was not followed at least three times by three different 
senders. This fact in and of itself, unrefuted, can only indicate the actual state of 
"establishment" of the polic}. Although Mr. Kavner testifies that his company does not send 
spam, see Garriotl Ct. Rec. p. 41-43 (Affidavit of Gene Kavner, Exhibit A to Defendant's 
Memorandum in S upport of Morion fui S ummary Judgment,: w e have at least three different 
occurrences which demonstrate the opposite. Without any opportunity to perform discover)7, 
reliance upon Mr. Kavner's testimony alone could not give the full story. This contradiction 
at least creates a genuine issue of fact for which summary judgment is not appropriate. 
Both the low er court and defendant rely heavily upon the existence of an Anti-Spam 
policy as basis for their decision and arguments. Section 13-36-105(4) of the Utah Code 
provides that Cw[t]he violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does not subject the 
employee" s employer to liability under that section if the employee's violation of Section 13-
36-103 is also a violation of an established policy of the employer that requires compliance 
with the requirements of Section 13-36-103." Based upon a literal review of thai statute, the 
lower court held that because defendant offered evidence of such a statute that it could not 
be held liable. If the statute should be strict!} construed, it applies only to employees, not 
12 
independent contractors. The lower court's argument is defeated by the very statute it rehes 
upon. 
It could not be the intention of the Utah Legislature to create the legal loophole 
created by the lower court's decision. If SPAM senders are actually able to avoid liability 
under the statute by simply contracting with an independent contractor, there is no worth to 
2. There Are at Least Two Versions of Redmond's Anti-Spam Policy. 
Because me lower court i elieti so heavih upon the alleged existence of an anti-SPAM 
policy, that policy deserves a thorough review. Review becomes even more pertinent 
because of the existence of the other, different spam policy. The Court found in these 
consolidated matters that because Defendant had an "established policy ... that requires 
compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-103," it therefore should not be liable for 
the illegal emails promoting its products as long as the emails were sent by Independent 
Contractors. It was not disputed that Plaintiffs received illegal emails. It was not disputed 
that those emails advertised commercial products sold by the Defendant. The Defendant sent 
or caused to be sent, offending emails. Nevertheless, the Court finds it immune from liability 
for that action, because of an alleged "RtdV Anti-Spam Agreement" Defendant allegedly 
causes each of its promoters to abide by. The only evidence Defendant produces are a self 
serving affidavit claiming that it follows the guidelines in an ''anti-spam agreement,'' and that 
"anti-spam agreement.'' which it supplied as exhibit 2 to its motion for summary judgment. 
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Without discovery, there is no way Plaintiff or any other person could know the veracity of 
those claims or that those documents were not just produced for the sole purpose of avoiding 
liability in this case. 
As recently brought 10 Plaintiffs counsel's attention, the '"Anti-spam Agreement" 
produced as Exhibit 2 of Defendant's summary judgment memorandum (See Fenn Ct. Rec. 
p. 45-47) is much different than what its attorney produced before thai motion was brought. 
See Fenn Ct. Rec. p. 120. The "RedV Anti-spam Agreement" supposedly followed and 
relied upon by Deiendants as uf two months before Defendant filed it's motion for summary 
judgment is much different than the RedV Anti-spam Agreement used as Exhibit for its 
mouon for summary judgment. As the Court can plainly see through a compaiison of the 
two, the first produced does not impose the specific requirements imposed by the second. 
It makes it even harder to believe that the second "RedV Anti-Spam Agreement'' is in 
actuality a true policy followed and enforced by the Defendant company when by all 
appearances it was produced solely for this litigation. Plaintiff must be able to conduct 
discover}7 to find what actually is or was at the time of the reception of the email, the "Anti-
Spam Agreement" if thai is what the Court believes can relieve Defendant of its liability for 
sending or causing to be sent UCE. 
Further, we have nothing in the record to demonstrate that there were any steps 
actually taken in furtherance of that policy. We have an affidavit which has not been 
subjected to cross-examination but which has been taken as factually correct by the Court. 
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This in a setting m which the Court has not permitted discovery to take place So what we 
have is a ruling which is premised on the Court's acceptance of self-serving facts, which may 
be convenient fictions that would not bear up under scrutiny, but which form the bedrock of 
the Court's ruling Given the differences between the TWO, both of which were provided b} 
Defendant, theie exist ai least a genuine issue of material fact as to which policy Defendants 
follow, if the\ do 
Construing the varying policies in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is at 
least an mrerence raised thai die policies are a fdbucaiion Since two different policies were 
pioduced in such a short time frame, a reasonable person could conclude that they were 
manufactured to defeat the claims in this case, and were not actual policies really adopted 
and enforced b} Defendant That inference should prevent summary judgment. 
3. Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been 
Granted, 
The standard for the grant 01 denial of summary judgment is well known [Sjummary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavit.0, if any, shov iLat there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the mo\ mg paity ib entire J to judgment d^ a matter of law Ut R Civ.P 
56®} (If the mo\ ant bears the buiden oi snowing tlie absence of a genuine issue of material 
laet the nonmovant may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts shown g 
a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters foi v hich it carries the burden of 
proof. See Waddoups i. The Amalgamated Svgar Co.. 54 P.3d 1054 OJtah 2003). 
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An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier 
of fact could resolve the issue either way. See Anderson v. Libert}' Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 
248[, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202] (1986). An issue of fact is "material" if under the 
substantive law h is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. See id. If a party that 
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not come forward with sufficient evidence 
on ail essential elements of its prima facie case, all issues concerning all other elements of 
the claim and any defenses become immaterial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 
322-23[, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265J (1986). 
The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Celotex, All U.S. at 323. 106 S.Ct. 2548. In so doing, a movant that will not bear the 
burden of persuasion at trial need nor negate the nonmovant's claim. See id. Such a movant 
may make its prima facie demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of 
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. See id. If the 
movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that would hear the burden of persuasion 
at trial may not simply rest upon its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go 
beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific fact" that would be admissible in evidence in the 
event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. Ut.R.Civ.P. 
56(e): See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89[, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 
L.Ed.2d 695] (1990); Celotex, All U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, All U.S. at 248[, 
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106 S Ct. 2505]. To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, 
deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein See Thomas \ Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 506 U.S. 1013[. 113 S.Ct. 
035 121 LEd.2d 566] (1992; Adlerv. Wal-Man Siores Inc., 144F.3d664, 670-71 (10th 
Cn 1998). 
In this case, Defendant filed its Motion for Summarv Judgment before either party had 
am opportunity to begin taking discovery. The only evidence supplied was in the form of 
anidavit testimony which could oniv be seen at> t>slf-*>crving and incomplete and copies of 
two different "anti-spam" policies. The language of Toebleman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe 
Lint Co.. 130 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir 1942) is particularly applicable to the instant case. 
'The case must, therefore, go back for further proceedings as to this cause of 
action m order to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to produce evidence of 
the tacts necessary to support the relief for which they ask. It is obvious that 
this evidence must come largely from the defendants. This case illustrates the 
danger of founding a judgment m favor of one party upon his own version of 
facts within his sole know ledge as set forth m affidavits prepared ex parte. 
Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records by 
the other part} frequent]}7 bring forth furthei facts w inch place a ver> different 
light upon the picture The plaintiffs should, therefore, be given a reasonable 
opportunity under proper safeguards, to take the depositions and have the 
discovery which the} seel: " 
Id at 1022 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for exactly this type of relief. 
That rule states 
"Should it appear from the affidauts of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justif} his 
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opposition, the court ma\ refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affida\ its to he obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discover} to be had 01 may make such other order as is just.'* 
The Utah Supieme Court has held on u numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions 
opposing a summar} judgment motion on the ground mat discover} has not been completed 
should be granted liberalh unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking m merit." Salt Lake 
Cumin i. Western Dawvmen Coop 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 20C2 > < citing Price De\ Co. v. Qrem 
Cm, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000), Crossland Sa\. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and 
Cox '\ Winiers, 678 P 2d 311 (jTdh 1984); 
In this case. Plaintiff s Motion was made and filed in February. 2003, discoverv Vvas 
not completed, m fact the process vvas never aUov\ eel to begin. See Gamott Ct Rec. p. 34-50. 
Theie were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for production, no 
depositions. These methods are necessary to flush out the facts and to determine plaintiffs 
claims on the merits, not on the pleadings The Plaintiff msde claims and the Defendant 
made its own claims m opposition cieatmg a situation of "he said, she said." There was no 
flushing out of the facts foi none w as allowed b\ the lower court. 
Discovery would have allowed the parties to determine several material facts, and 
crosi>-examine Redmond on then differing assertions, including whether or not Redmond 
actual!} did or does comph with an anti-spam pohc}, and if it does, which one it complies 
v ith Furthermore, as stated by the lower court. "notabl\ absent from the affidavit is a direct, 
categorical statement that [the] senders are not now. nor ha^e they evei been RedV 
18 
Promoters or employees." See Garriott Ct. Rec. p. 144, f 22. Because so much of the lower 
court's decision was based upon the affidavits of the parties, the discovery process would be 
used to verify or contradict the testimony actually submitted. Because there was no 
discovery, there was no opportunity to cross-examine either party's assertions. 
Plaintiff's motion was submitted in a timely fashion, with pertinent rationale and 
necessity. Notwithstanding that and the Utah Supreme Court's many findings that Rule 56(f) 
motions should be granted liberally, in this case, it was not. Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court correct the lower court's error by remanding this matter for further discovery and 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in every respect in its ruling. It adopted a judicially amended 
Statute which bore no relationship to what the Utah Legislature intended. It did not only 
violence, but effected a reversal of the Statute's effect and intent. It creates a legal loophole 
for any entity which completely destroys any effectiveness for the Utah statute. It stretches 
the language into such distortions and distensions that we have, under the lower court's view, 
a "Utah Pro-Spam Act" in place of what the Legislature was attempting to enact. 
Further, discovery was essential before making the factual determinations below. 
Discovery was prohibited, in violation of the Rules. Summary Judgment was not 
appropriate. 
19 
DATED this day of March, 2004. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
'^a 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
^Aitorne}/ for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Redmond's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, Utah Code §§13-
36-101 to 13-36-105 (2002). 




THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
"SANDY-OEPT. 
s 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
D ANTEL GARRIOTT, on behalf of himself and 
others similarly situated, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs 
REDMOND VENTURE, INC and JOHN DOES ; 
one through ten whose true names are unknown, ] 
Defendant ] 
BRJTTNEY FENN, on behalf of herself and ; 
others similarly situated, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
REDMOND VENTURE, INC and JOHN DOES ; 
one through ten whose true names are unknown, ] 
Defendant ] 
JANE JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
REDMOND VENTURE, INC and JOHN DOES ; 
one through ten whose true names are unknown, ] 
Defendant ] 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
) and MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) CaseNos 020414285 (Garriott) 
) 020413641(Fenn) 
) 020414263 (Johnson) 
) Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
T|l Plaintiffs Daniel Garriott ("Garriott"), Brittney Fenn ("Fenn"), and Jane Johnson 
("Johnson") have filed essentially identical actions l against Defendant Redmond Venture, Inc. 
("RedV") seeking damages as a result of Defendant's alleged violation of the Unsolicited 
JThe only substantive difference among the cases was that two of them, Garriott and Fenn, also sought 
certification as class actions, whereas the Johnson case did not. 
1 
Commercial Email Act (the "Act") Utah Code Ann §13-36-102(2002) Pending before the 
Court are two motions filed by Defendant Garnott First is a motion to consolidate the three 
cases 5eeUtahR Civ P 42(a) The Court GRANTS Garriott's motion to consolidate 2 
Pursuant to Utah R Jud Admin 4-103, disposition on all three cases will now be entered under 
case no 020413641, the lowest number assigned to the three cases 
TJ2 Second is a summary judgment motion, supported by a memorandum of law and ari 
affidavit by RedV's Chief Executive Officer Gene Kavner ("Kavner") Similar motions and 
memoranda have also been filed by Defendant in the other two cases Plaintiffs have filed 
memoranda in Opposition to the summary judgment motions, supported by affidavits 
<P Defendant requested oral argument on its parallel summary judgment motions Plaintiffs 
did not request oral argument 
<|j4 UtahR Jud Admin 4-501(3) generally requires the Court to hear a dispositive motion 
upon a properly filed request by one or more of the parties After reviewing the parties' 
memoranda, affidavits, and the governing law, however, the Court concludes that oral argument 
would not materially assist it in reaching a decision The law that governs the decision on these 
cases is clear and unambiguous These are not cases where the Court must evaluate and select 
betwen competing legal principles Accordingly, Defendant's request for oral argument is 
DENIED as unnecessary 
f 5 For the reasons more fully set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's summary 
judgment motion in these consolidated cases 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
^6 Garnott received an unsolicited email on September 7, 2002 from sender "Norm" at the 
email address "prosper 1007538w71@winning com " Complaint Proposed Class Action, Civ No 
020404285, at Exhibit A, Garriott Aff at 3, ffi}4, 6 The email advertised RedV's 
PopupProtector™ 
[^7 Fenn received an unsolicited email on September 9, 2003 from "ClickForMail" at the 
email address cccfm@clickformail com '' Complaint Proposed Class Action, Civ No 020413641, 
at Exhibit A, Fenn Aff at 3, ffl|4, 6 The email advertised RedV's historyProtector™ 
|^8 Johnson received an unsolicited email on September 8, 2003 from "ProConsumer" at the 
email address "Statt2447p00@prontomail com " Complaint, Civ No 020404263, at Exhibit A, 
Johnson Aff at 3, ffl}4, 6 The email advertised RedV's PopupProtector™ 
2On April 2, 2003 Defendant filed Notices to Submit for Decision in all three cases Plaintiffs did not oppose the 
motions to consolidate The Court ruled on two of the motions (in the Fenn and Johnson cases), granting them, but 
somehow failed to act in the Garriott case Counsel for Defendant was requested to prepare and submit an Order 
reflecting consolidation, but apparently the Order was never filed with the Court 
2 
^9 RedV is a Washington corporation with all rights and title to technology used to remove 
certain components from Internet programs and pop-up browser windows Kavner Aif at 2, p 
RedV has incorporated its proprietary technology into a group of software products known as 
"ProtectorSuite" software Id. at ^4 
T|10 Through Kavner, RedV asserts that it did not directly send the challenged emails to 
Garriott Fenn or Johnson Kavner Aif at 3, ^ 10 See also id., at 4, ^12 (addressing Fenn case), 
id., at 4, %\ 1 (addressing Johnson case) In response, Plaintiffs, through their affidavits, allege 
that the unsolicited commercial emails ("UCEs") they received were "sent by or at the behest of 
Redmond, with advertising for products and promotions." Garriott Aff at 3, ]]4, Fenn Aff at 3, 
TJ4, Johnson Aif at 3, |^4 Indeed, Plaintiffs' affidavits specifically assert that each of them has 
"never had any business or personal relationship with Defendant, nor [have they ever] given 
permission to Defendant to receive emai![s] from [Defendant] or one of [its] "Promoters " 
Garriott Aif at 3 J 5 , Fenn Aif at 3 J 5 , Johnson Aff at 3, ^5 
1fl 1 RedV acknowledges that it employs contractors ("Promoters") to market its software 
Kavner Aff at 2, ^5 However, according to the Kavner affidavit, "RedV does not control the 
day-to-day operations of its [Promoters] or the marketing methods employed by the 
[Promoters] " Id. at 2, ^6, see also, Agreement at 1,1H|l(a), 1(d), 1(f), Agreement at 2, ^6 
RedV's Promoters are required to market software according to the "RedV Network Affiliate 
Program" ("Agreement") Id at 2, ^5 Promoters of RedV products are also required to agree to 
all terms of the RedV Anti-Spam Agreement ("Spam Agreement"), which is found on the RedV 
website 3 Spam Agreement at 1, Agreement at 1, l}l(f) 
*U12 Promoters market RedV's software through "one or more World Wide Web sites 
operated by the Promoter, either from advertising which is located within the Promoter's 
software, or by the use of other marketing tools which provide a link to RedV's server." 
Agreement at 1 RedV anticipates that emails and/or electronic communications will be sent 
promoting RedV products Spam Agreement at 1, Tjl.1. 
^13 RedV's policies specifically address the use of commercial email Promoters must agree 
to comply with the P.edV Anti-Spam Agreement, which prohibits the promotion of RedV 
products through UCEs Agreement at 1, l(l(f}5 see also Spam Agreement at 1, ffl|l-l 1 2 
RedV's Anti-Spam policy further provides that each Promoter must "comply with any and all 
regulations, statutes and applicable laws related to email and/or electronic communications " 
Spam Agreement at 2,1J1.12 Finally, the agreement makes it "the Promoter's responsibility to be 
aware of all applicable regulations, statutes and laws " Id. 
TJ14 RedV maintains a list of its current and former Promoters and their email addressed 
Kavner Aif at 3, %9 RedV asserts it does not have and has never had email addresses for 
"Norm," id at 3, [^10, "ClickForMail" (Fenn), id at 4 ^12 or "ProConsumer" (Johnson) Id at 4 
1111 
3Copies of the RedV Network Affiliate Program Agreement and RedV's Anti-Spam Agreement were also filed as 
attachments to the Kavner affidavit and have been reviewed by the Court 
3 
ANALYSIS 
1J15 Pursuant to Utah R Civ P 42(a), "[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or 
fact are pending before the court, it may order all the actions consolidated " Defendant's 
motion to consolidate three cases (all filed in the Sandy Department, involving common issues of 
law and fact, and involving the same counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendant) is unopposed by 
Plaintiff For reasons of judicial economy the Court concludes that consolidation of these three 
cases is warranted 
If 16 With respect to the summary judgment motion, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' position that 
Defendant's motions should be treated as 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss, instead of as Motions for 
Summary Judgment Opposition at 3 Utah R Civ P 56 specifically states that a party against 
whom a claim is asserted "may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof" UtahR Civ P 56(b) That is 
precisely what has happened here Although Plaintiffs object that no discovery has taken place, 
none of them has filed a Rule 56(f) motion identifying specific discovery needed in order to 
respond to the present motions 
^17 The parties have filed affidavits in support of their respective positions There are no 
material issues of fact in dispute4, the issue for decision-whether, on these facts, Plaintiffs can 
state a claim for relief-is purely a question of law Summary judgment is proper when "there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " 
Doit, Inc. v. Touch, Ross & Co., 926 P 2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996) In deciding a summary 
judgment motion the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 63 P 3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002) 
[^18 Subject matter jurisdiction has been provided by the Act. Defendant has not contested 
jurisdiction or venue in this Court 
^19 The Act governing unsolicited commercial email establishes liability for cc[e]ach person 
who sends or causes to be sent" a UCE, if the UCE does not meet the requirements set forth in 
the statute Utah Code Ann § 13-16-104 (2002). In this case, it is undisputed that the UCEs 
received by Plaintiffs do not comply with the Act's requirements 
f20 Although Plaintiffs' affidavits assert that RedV "sent" the UCEs at issue in these casei, 
those assertions simply cannot have been made from personal knowledge Affidavits supporting or 
4Although at ^ [20 of this Memorandum Decision the Court notes that the parties dispute whether or not RedV 
"sent" the UCEs at issue, this Court has assumed Plaintiffs' allegations to be true-that is, that the individuals or 
entities who actually sent the UCEs are, m fact, either "employees" or "independent contractors" of RedV See 
infra |^23 Thus, the factual dispute is not matenal to the resolution of this case, which resolution is premised on 
established legal precedent regarding liability of "principals" for the actions of independent contractors, and the 
Act's own built-in exception to liability for actions taken by employees, if those actions are in derogation of 
established company policy Utah Code Ann §13-36-105(4). 
4 
opposing motions for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P 2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) citing Walker v Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 
508 P 2d 538 (Utah 1973), see also Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P 2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979) 
(affidavits are admissible unless they are not made on personal knowledge) Moreover, these 
assertions are directly contradicted by Kavner's affidavit, wherein he states that RedV udid not 
send the September 7, 2002 email to Mr Garriott RedV does not have and has never had Mr 
Garriott's email address or any other email address listed in the email " Kavner AfF at 3 ^  10 See 
also Kavner AfF at 4, f^l 1 (making same assertion with respect to Johnson), id at 4, J^12 (same 
with respect to Fenn) Additionally, the print-out of the UCEs received by Plaintiffs, and attached 
by them to their Complaints, show no indication that the UCEs were sent from RedV 
1(21 However, the claim thai the alleged UCEs were sent "at the behest o f RedV bears closer 
scrutiny, as it potentially could subject RedV to liability under the Act if RedV caused those 
UCEs to be sent Utah Code Ann §13-36-103 
[^22 RedV asserts that it keeps a file of all past and current Promoters, and that RedV does not 
and has never had email addresses for Norm, ClickForMail, or ProConsumer Kavner Aff at 3, 
T[10, see also id at ffl{ 11, 12 Clearly, RedV would have the Court draw the inference that none 
of these senders is a RedV Promoter However, notably absent from the affidavit is a direct, 
categorical statement that these senders are not now, nor have they ever been, RedV Promoters 
or employees 
J^23 As noted supra at [^17, in deciding a summary judgment motion the Court draws all 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 63 P 3d at 725 
Therefore, for present purposes the Court assumes that in each of these cases, the actual sender of 
the alleged UCEs is either a RedV Promoter or a RedV employee The question then is whether 
the actions of these Promoters or employees are sufFicient to impose liability upon RedV on the 
basis that it "caused" the UCEs to be sent 
TJ24 There are no facts before the Court to counter the Kavner affidavit's assertion that 
Promoters are independent contractors 5 The Court must accept this representation RedV then 
argues that it cannot be held liable for actions undertaken by independent contractors, especially 
when such actions, if in fact taken by its Promoters, would have been in derogation of RedV s 
established Network Affiliate and anti-Spam policies The Court agrees 
TJ25 Generally, in a tort context, "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants " 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P 2d 322, 325 (Utah 1996)(emphasis added), See also Gleason v. Salt 
Lake City, 74 P 2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937) 
5
 Independent contractors are distinguished from agents because principals lack the requisite control over 
independent contractors that would give nse to liability On the other hand, "agency is the fiduciary relation which 
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject 
to his control, and consent by the other so to act " Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958) 
5 
P 6 This Court has previously noted that "[njothing in the plain language of the Act appears to 
recognize any 'injury' on the part of the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email " See, e.g, 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Mindshare Design, Inc 's Motion to Dismiss on 
Jurisdictional Grounds, No 020412664, J^20 (Third District Court, Sandy Dept, filed April 22, 
2003) Accordingly, this Court has not been "persuaded that a violation of [the Act] rises to the 
level of a tort within the meaning of the long-arm statute" id, citing Prince v Bear River Mut. 
Ins,, 2002 UT 68 ]^47 ("Where a statute provides a specific civil legal remedy to redress an injury 
in violation of that statute, a tort aciion for violation of the public policy embodied m the statute 
will not lie") Nevertheless, assuming, for the sake of argument, thai one or more of RedV's 
independent contractors was (were) actually responsible for sending the offending UCEs, and that 
such actions caused tortious injury to Plaintiffs, under governing precedent the Court concludes 
that RedV would not be legally responsible for those actions 
f27 To be sure, Utah law has recognized limited exceptions to the general rule of no liability to 
principals for actions by independent contractors See, e.g,, Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 74 P 2d at 
1232, Thompson v. Jess, 979 P 2d at 326 However, the courts have described the exceptions as 
"narrow," arising "in the unique circumstance where an employer of an independent contractor 
exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care, The 
duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the circumstances and is confined in scope 
to the control asserted "6 E.g., Thompson v. Jess, 979 P 2d at 326 
TJ28 In these cases, the exception does not apply because the undisputed facts are that "RedV 
does not control the day-to-day operations of its [Promoters] or the marketing methods employed 
by the [Promoters] " Id at 2, 1J6, see also Agreement at 1, HI (a), 1(d), 1(f), Agreement at 2, f6 
^29 In addition, RedV's Spam Agreement specifically requires its Promoters to agree "not to 
use SPAM [sic] in its promotion of RedV's products " Spam Agreement at 1 RedV's policy 
also requires its Promoters to "comply with any and all regulations, statutes and applicable laws 
related to email and/or electronic communications It is the Promoter's responsibility to be aware 
of all applicable regulations, statutes and laws " Id at 2 While RedV's anti-spam policy does not 
specifically list the requirements of Utah's Act, it clearly imposes a duty on RedV's Promoters to 
know and fully comply with all of the Act's specific requirements 
T|30 Furthermore, if Promoters use solicited emails to advertise RedV Products, RedV policy 
sets forth additional qualifications for those advertisements RedV requires that its Promoters (1) 
not send emails with misleading and/or false information, (2) include an unsubscribe link in any 
solicited email they send, (3) include a text or graphic header or footer describing why the 
recipient is receiving the mail and/or electronic communications, (4) include where the recipient 
agreed to receive email and/or electronic communications from the Promoter, (5) use valid return 
email addresses, street addresses, and (6) include the date or time the message was sent Spam 
^tah cases discussing the exceptions to the general rule of no liability for acts of independent contractors have 
uniformly involved factually-distinguishable cases where the tort of which plaintiffs complained resulted m 
physical harm to individuals No caselaw has been provided to the Court suggesting that principals may be held 
liable for acts of independent contractors m situations where no physical harm has resulted 
6 
Agreement at 1, ffif 1 2, 1 3, 1 5, 1 6, 1 7 These requirements are consistent with the provisions 
of Utah's Act 
1^31 The Court concludes that even if the individuals or entities that sent Plaintiffs the 
offending UCEs are (or were) RedV Promoters, RedV itself cannot be held liable under the Act 
on the theory that RedV "caused7 those UCEs to be sent If sent by RedV Promoters the actions 
of those alleged Promoters were clearly unauthorized under the explicit terms of RedV s policies 
p 2 The Court s conclusion is bolstered by the Act's plain language, which creates an 
exception to liability for unsolicited emails sent by an entity's employees "The violation of 
section 13-36-103 by an employee does not subject the employee's employer to liability under 
ihat section if the employee's violation of Section 13-26-103 is also a violation of an established 
policy of the employer that requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-103 " 
Utah Code Ann § 13-36-105(4)(Supp 2002) RedVs agreements with its Promoters outline the 
established policies of the company with respect to how marketing of RedV products may and 
may not, be conducted Those established policies express^ require RedV representatives to 
comply with all the particulars of state anti-spam laws Tnus, if an employee s unauthorized 
actions would not subject RedV to liability under the Act for actions taken in derogation of its 
company's established policy, then similar unauthorized actions b> independent contractors 
cannot be construed to create liability for RedV 
Garnott's "Trespass to Chattels" claim 
T]33 As a final matter, the Court notes that Garnott's Complaint filed December 17 2002, did 
not include a Trespass to Chattels claim Further, Garnott has not moved the Court for leave to 
amend his Complaint to include such a claim However, in his April 7, 2003 Opposition to 
Defendant's motion Garnott, for the first time, included such a claim The Court concludes that 
Garnott's Trespass to Chattels claim is not properly before the Court and therefore the Court 
declines to address it 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
p 4 Defendant's Motion to consolidate the Garnott, Fenn, and Johnson cases is GRANTED 
Disposition of the three cases will be consolidated under case number 020413641 Defendant's 
Motions for Summary Judgment on all three cases are also GRANTED Defendant s Motion for 
Oral Argument DENIED Pursuant to Utah R Jud Admin 4-504, Defendant s counsel is to 
prepare an Order consistent with the Court s decision on these motions SO ORDERED 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 814 
trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objections must be 
heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments ; costs . 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment' ' as used in these rules 
includes a decree and any order from 'which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of 
a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multi-
ple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in 
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the part ies shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and trie rights 
and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered b}^  default, every final judgment shall 
grant, the relief to which the par ty in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even, if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of 
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it. determine the ul t imate rights of the parties on 
each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. Ajudgment by default shall not 
be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, tha t specifically 
praved for in the demand for judgment. 
id) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a s ta tu te of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
par ty unless the court otherwise directs: provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determi-
nation of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must 
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disburse-
ments in the action, and file with the court a like memoran-
dum thereof duly verified stat ing tha t to affiant's knowledge 
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A parry 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after sendee of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have 
the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or 
at the time of or subsequent to the sendee and filing of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. but before the entry of 
judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed 
on the date-judgment is entered. 
(d)(3) [Deleted.] ' 
(d)(4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The 
clerk must include in an}'judgment signed by him any interest 
on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and 
the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The 
clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, 
insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for 
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the 
register of actions and in the "judgment docket. 
Rule 55. Default . 
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
annear the clerk shall enter the default of that Dart v. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as 
follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk 
shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs agamst 
the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to ap-
pear: 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent 
person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personallv sen/ed pursu-
ant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
<'b)(l)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum 
certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If. in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the t ruth of any averment 
by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court 
may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default 
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counter claimants, cross-claimants. The provi-
sions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the 
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a 
party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all 
cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of
 & 
Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. 
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of 
Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment . 
(a) Fo^ claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment ma}', at any time after the expiration of 2G days from tiie 
commencement of the action or after sendee of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse par ty move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memo-
randa and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance 
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with CJA 4-501 The judgment sousm shall be rendered if tne 
-pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admis-
sions on file, together with the afl&da-its if anv show tna t 
xnexe is no genuine issue as to any mater ia! fact ano m a t the 
moving par tv is ennt iea to a judgment as a mat ter of iav A 
summary judgment interlocutor*' m cnaracter mav be ren-
dered on the issue of liability alone altfiougn there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages 
id) Case not full's aaiudicatea on motion If on motion uncier 
this rule judgment is not rendered -non the wnole case 01 lor 
all the relief asked and a trial AS necessary the court at the 
hearing of the motion by examining the pleadings and tne 
evidence beiore it and DV interrogating counsel snail if prac-
ticable ascertain wnat material facts exist witnout substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actuallv and in good 
faith controverted It snail tnereupon mane an order specify-
-.y\<— •'•Kc T O P T r f n o t a n - r i n o - r T T T i r n n n T n n r\«-T- rj-ri-r-i o 1 n r m l - c m r o r e v 11-J.CJ "•*••*•»-' l U b t o ui.j.<-i.u u. M j-'V./CJ.x vvj.wa.uui. o u u o i / U i i u u i U U I I L I \J v c i a J 
uicluding the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy and directing sucn rurtner proceed-
ings in the action as are just Upon the tr ial of tiie action the 
fects so specified shall be deemed estabhsned. and tiie trial 
sJiall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits furtner testimony defense required 
Supporting ana opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, snail set forth sucn facts as would be admissible m 
competent to testifv to the mat ters stated therein Sworn or 
certified copies 01 all papers or parts thereof referred to m an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The 
court may permit affidavits to oe supplemented or opposed DV 
depositions answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits 
When a motion for summary ludgment is made and supported 
EL£ provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or demais of his pleading, but ins 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided m this rule, 
mus t set forth specmc facts shoving thai tnere is a genuine 
issue for trial If he does not so respond summary "judgment, 
if appropriate shall be entered against him 
<f) Wfieri affidavits are unavailable Should it appear from 
the affidavits of a partv opposing the motion tha t he cannot for 
reasons stated present bv affidavit facts essential to justify ms 
opposition, the court mav refuse tne application 101 "judgment 
or mav order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained 
or depositions to be tahen or discovery to be nad or may maite 
sucn other order as is just 
tg) Affidavits maae in bad faith Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time tha t any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented m bad faith or 
soieiv for the purpose oi delay, the court snail forthwith order 
the par ty employing them to pav to the othei partv the 
amount of the reasonable expenses whicn the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorneys 
fees and am* offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt 
R u l e 57. D e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t s . 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursu-
ant to Chapter 33 of Title 78 U Ci-x 1953 shall oe m 
accordance with tnese ruies and the rignt to trial DV jury mav 
be demanded under the circumstances and in tne manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39 Tne existence of another ade-
quate remedv does not preclude a judgment for declaratory 
rehef in cases where it is appropriate The court ma^ order a 
speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar 
R u l e 58A. En t ry . 
i.a) Judgment iwon the verdict of a wry Unless the court 
otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54ib; 
ludgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed 
D~- the clem ana died If there is a special verdict oi a general 
verdict accompanied DV answers to interrogatories returned 
D"" a par5 pursuant tc Rule 49 the court snail direct tne 
appropriate magment wmch shall oe forthwith signed oy the 
cierit and filed 
'b; Judgment in otner cases Except as provided m Subdi-
vision ia» nereof and Subdivision fb)il; of Rule 55 all judg-
ments shall be signed b^ the mdge and filed with the cierk 
ic; When judgment entered notation in register of actions 
ant ucgme~i: accxet A judgment is complete and snail be 
deemed entered for all purposes except the creation ot a hen 
on real property when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided The clerk shall immediately maite a notation 
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment 
dochet. 
<d> Notice of signing ov cnt~n of judgment A copy of the 
signed yadgment snail be promptly served bv the partv pre-
paring it m the manner provided m Rule 5 The time for nlmg 
a notice of appeal is not affected bv the requirement of this 
provision 
(e) Judgment arte? death of a pa^ry If a party dies after a 
verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment 
•judgment mav nevertheless be rendered thereon 
if Judgment 02 confession Whenever a judgment bv con-
fession is authorized o" s tatute tne parn seemng trie same 
must file with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is 
to be entered a s tatement verified by the deiendant to the 
following effect 
1 f)' 1) If the judgment to be confessed is for monev due or to 
become due it shall concisely state the claim and that the sum 
coniessed tnerefor is justiv aue or to become due 
(f)(2) If the judgment to be confessec is for tne purpose of 
securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must 
State concisely the claim and that the sum coniessed therefor 
does not exceed the same. 
'f X31 It must authorize the entrv of judgment for a specified 
sum 
The clerii shall thereupon endorse upon the statement and 
enter in tne judgment docket, a judgment 01 the court lor the 
amount confessed with costs of entry if any 
J tule 58B. Sa t i s fac t ion of j u d g m e n t . 
(a) Satisfaction o« owner or attorney A judgment ma~ be 
satisfied m whole or in par t as to anv or all of the magment 
debtors, bv the owner thereof or bv the attorney of record of 
the raagment creditor wnere no assignment 0: the judgment 
lias beer filed ana such attorney executes such satisfaction 
within eight vears alter the entry of the judgment m the 
lollowmg manner (1) DV writ ten instrument duly acknowl-
edged DV such owner or attorney, or (2) bv acknowledgment of 
such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered 
on the dochet of the judgment in the county where nrst 
docketed with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk 
£verv satis taction of a part of the magment or as to one 01 
more cf the mdgment debtors snail state tne amount paid 
tnereon or tor tne release of sucn deDtors naming tnem 
(b) Satisfaction o*\ orae^ oj court When a udgment shall 
have been fuhv paid and not satisfied of record or when the 
satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost the court in 
wmch such judgment was recovered may. upon motion and 
satisfactory proof authorize the attorned of the judgment 
creditor to satisrv the same or may enter an order declaring 
the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered upon 
the docket 
ic; Entr\ bv clern Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judg-
ment duiv executed and acknowledged, the cierk snail file the 
same with tne papers m the case, ana enter it on tne register 
ADDENDUM 3 
563 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
-36-103 
i5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in 
tha t relevant market area are providing aaecmaie service 
to consumers for the powersport venicies of the line-maite 
which snail mciuae tne adeauacT of the powersport vehi-
par ts ana qualified service personnel 2002 
l£-35-307. F r a n c h i s o r ' s r e p u r c h a s e o b l i g a t i o n s u p o n 
t e r m i n a t i o n or n o n c o n i i n u a t i o n of f r a n c h i s e . 
Q) Upon the termination or nonconiinuation of a francmse 
&r tne franchisor tne rrancnisor snali pa^ the franchisee 
'a) the franchisee s cost of new undamaged and unsold 
powersport vehicles m the franchisee s inventor^ acauired 
from the francnisor or another franchisee 01 the same 
lme-maite representing botn tne current moae. -"-ear at 
the time of termination or noncontmuation and the im-
mediately prior model year vehicles 
(iy Dius an}T charges maae DT7 tne francnisor for 
distribution deliver1 or taxes 
(II) plus the franchisee s cost of any accessories 
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased ana 
(III) less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee bv the franchisor 
(b) the cost of all new undamaged and unsold sup-
plies parts and accessories as set forth in the franchisor s 
catalog at the time of termination or nonconiinuation for 
Hie supplies parts and accessorise j.e3s ai ahc"Tanccs 
paid or credited to the franchisee D^  the rrancnisor 
ic) the fair market value but not les- than tne irancni-
see s depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign 
owned bv the franchisee tha t bears a common name trade 
•name, DT x i a d e m a r t oi Yne franckiiB&T v atqmsTLioY. 01 ine 
sign was recommended or required by the franchisor If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed 
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro rata portion of 
the sign 
(d) the fair market value but not less than tne fran-
chisees depreciated acquisition cost or all special tools 
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved bv the francnisor that were recom-
mended or required bv the franchisor ana are in good and 
usable condition and 
(e) tne cost of transporting, handling packing, and 
loading powersport vehicles supplies parts accessories 
signs, special tools equipment and furnishings 
(2) The franchisor shall pav the francnisee the amounts 
pecihea m Subsection t1 ; within 90 aavs after the tender of 
he property to the franchisor if the franchisee 
(a) has clear title to the property and 
(b) is m a position to convev title to the franchisor 
'3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are sub)ect to a 
ec^rity interest tne francnisor may nictke payment ioiiitl > xo 
ie franchisee and to the hoiaer of the security mtei est 2002 
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3^36-103 Unsolicited commercial or sexually explicit 
email — Pv,eauirements 
3-36-10^ Criminal penalty 
3-36-105 Civil action for violation — Election on dam-
ages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense 
3-36-101. Ti t le . 
'This chapter is known as the "Unsolicited Commercial and 
equally Explicit Email Act" 2002 
13-36-102 Def in i t ions . 
As usee ir this cnapter 
(1> "Commercial' means lor the purpose of promoting 
the sale .ease 0^ exchange of gooas ser\_ces or real 
propern 
2> ' Computer nervo1*-* means two or more computers 
tnat are interconnected tc e .cnange electronic messages 
files data or other miormation 
3 J Email ' means an electronic message file data or 
other ±mormatiOn tnat it> t iansm.t tea 
ia; between two or more computers compute1 net-
vrorKS or electronic termi.idis u 
(b) within a computer network 
(4; Email address means a destination cornmonh 
expressed as a string of characters to wnicn email ma1 oe 
sent or aehveied 
i5> Eman sen ice proviuei means a person that 
(a) is an intermedial \ m the tiansmission of email 
from tne senaer to the recipient o? 
<b) provides to end users 01 email service the 
adiht\ to send and receive email 
(6) ' In ternet domain name means a globalh unique, 
hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service, 
assignee through centralized Internet authonties com-
prising a ^e^-ies of character strings separated bi periods 
with the ^ignr-mos" s tung specnvmg the top or the hier-
arcn^ 
(7) (a) "Sexualh explicit email" means an email that 
contains promotes or contains an electronic link to 
material Uiat is harmful to miriQis, as denned. in, 
Section 76-10-1201 
(o> An email is a 'sexuallv explicit email' if it 
meets the definition in Subsection D ( a even if the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email 
(8) iaj 'Unsolicited means without the recipients ex-
press permission except as provided m Suosection 
(8Kb) 
\b) A commercial email is not 'unsolicited' ii the 
sender has a preexisting business or persona, rela-
tionship with tne recipient 2002 
lS-36-103. L n s o l i c i t e d c o m m e r c i a l or sexual ly explici t 
emai l — R e q u i r e m e n t s . 
fV Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic-
ited commercial email 01 an unsolicited sexualh explicit eman 
thxougn the intermediary of an email service provider located 
m the state or to an email address neld b^ a resident 01 the 
state shall 
^a conspicuously state in the email tne senders 
u; lega1 name 
111) correct street adchess ana 
'inj ^and Internet domain name 
(b1 mciuae m the emai1 a suoiect line that contains 
(1) for a commercial email ' ADV as tne first foui 
characters, or 
ai) for a sexualn explicit eman AJDV ADULT' as 
tne first nine characters 
<c> provide the recipient a convenient no-co^t mecna-
msn. to notir" the sender not to sena an*\ ruture email to 
the recipient including 
u return email to a valid functioning return elec-
tronic address and 
11 foi a sexuali^ explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free te'ephone numoer tne sendev - toll-
free telephone numoei and 
id conspicuously provide m the text of the email a. 
notice tnat 
{1) informs the recipient that the recipient ma,T 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from iuture 
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commercial or sexualh explicit email as tiie case 
ma^ be from the sender and 
111J for a sexua lh exphcir email and if the sender 
las a toll-free telephone n amber includes the send-
er s -valid toll-free telephone numDe r tha t the recipi-
ent mav call to be excluded from ruture eman from 
the sender 
(2> 4 person who sends or causes to oe sent an unsolicited 
commercial email or an unsolicited sexuain explicit email 
through tne intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an emdu address held bT a resident of the 
state may not 
la use a third p a r t v s Internet domain name m identi-
fying the point of origin or m stating the transmission 
patli of the email without the third pa r tvs consent 
'L misrepresent ar jT information m identifying; the 
point of origin or the transmission path of tne email or 
fc» fail to include m tne email the information neces 
sarv to ictentifH the DOLV of origin or tne eman 
(3; If tne recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender tha t the 
recipient does not want to receive ruture commeicial email or 
future sexually explicit email respectively from the sendei 
the senaer maA not send t na t recipient «. commeicial email o^ 
a s e x u a l explicit ema_l as the ra c* mav he eithe1- directly o^ 
through a subsidiary or affiliate 2002 
13-36-104. C r i m i n a l p e n a l t y . 
(1) A person wiic violates anv requirement of Section 13-
36-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexual^ explicit email is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a lesult of 
a criminal conviction under Suosection (1) does not relieve the 
person convicted 01 assessed from civil liability m an action 
under Section 13-36-105 2002 
13-36-105. Civi l a c t i o n for v io l a t ion — E l e c t i o n on 
d a m a g e s — Cos ts a n d a t t o r n e v fees — De-
f e n s e 
(1) For anv violation of a piovision of Section 13-36-103, an 
action ma\ be brought by 
(ai a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
eman or unsolicited sexuallv explicit email with respect to 
which the violation unuer Section 13-36-103 nrcurred or 
(b) an email service provider through whose facilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was t ransmit ted 
(2) In each action unaer Subsection (1) 
a a recipient or email service provider mav 
(lj recover actual damages or 
(11) elect in lieu of actuai damages to recover the 
lesser of 
(A) $10 per unsolicited commercial email o^ 
unsolicited sexualh explicit email leceivea by 
the recipient 0- transmitted through the email 
se^wice provider or 
(B) S>25 000 per aav tha t the violation occurs 
anc 
(D) each pre\ailin:r recipien~ o* emai1 s e^ ice pro^icier 
snail oe awarded costs and leasonaole attorney iees 
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 13-
36-103 solely by bemg an mte rmedia r between the sender 
and recipient in the transmission of an email tnat violates 
that section 
i4* The violation of Section 13-36-103 ov an employee does 
not subiect ttie employees employer to liability under that 
section if the employee s violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
a violation of an established pohc} of the employer that 
reauires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-
103 
5) it is a deiense to an action brougnt unae r this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexuallv 
explicit eman was transmitted accidentally 2002 
CHAPTER 37 
VOTTCE OF INTENT TO SELL NONPUBLIC 
P E R S O N A L INFORMATION ACT [EFFECTIVE 
JANIT^RY I, 20041 
P a r t 1 
G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n s [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004] 
Section 
13 37 101 Title [Effective January 1 2004] 
lu-u7-lC2 Lefinitions Tfrectjvt JanuarTT 1, 2004] 
Not ice of D i sc lo su re [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004] 
13 37-201 Reauired notice [Effective J a n u a n 1 2004] 
13 3"" 202 Disclosure 01 nonpublic personal information 
promoted without notice [Effective January 
1 2004] 
13 -37 - JOC Liability iErrective j a n u a n ^ 230^] 
PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE JANUARY I. 
2004J 
13-37-101. Ti t le [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]. 
Tins cnapter is known as the "Notice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information ACT ' 200a 
13-37-102. Def in i t ions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004]. 
AS used m this chapter 
(1 Affiliate means a persor tnat controls is con-
trolled h^ or is onaev common control with 
(a) a commercial entity and 
(b) (1) directly or 
(nj indirectly through one or more intermedi-
aries 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b) 'commercial er-
t i n " means a person that 
11) has an office or otnei place of busmess 
located m tne state and 
(11) in the o r d i n a l course 0" business trans-
acts a consumer transaction m this state 
(b) "Commercial ent in does not mexuae 
(i> a governmental entir* or 
(11) an entrn providing services on oehalf of a 
governmental e n t m 
i3) 'Compensation means anything of economic value 
tha t is paid or transferred to a commercial entitv foi or m 
direct consideratior of the disclosure of nonpublic per-
sonal imoimation 
4 (d) ' Consume** transaction means 
(1) a sale lease assignment awara bi chance 
or other written 0** oral transfer or disposition 




(II) services ov 
(III) othei tangible or intangible 
propert} except securities and insur-
ance or services related thereto or 
ADDENDUM 4 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL GARRIOTT, individually and on 
behalf of others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
REDMOND VENTURE. INC and JOHN 
DOES one through ten whose true names are 
unknown, 
Defendants 
BPJTTNEY FENN, individually and on 
behalf of others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REDMOND VENTURE, INC and JOHN 






REDMOND VENTURE, INC and JOHN 
DOES one through ten whose true names are 
unknown, 
Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING CONSOLIDATION 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
riv-i! ivil No 020413641 (Fenn) 
Consolidated with 
Civil No 020414263 (Johnson) 
Civil No 020414285 (Garriott) 
Judae Denise P Lindbero; 
598570 1 
Plaintiffs Daniel Garriott ("Garriott"), Brittney Fenn ("Fenn"), and Jane Johnson 
("Johnson") have filed essentially identical actions1 against defendant Redmond Venture. Inc 
("RedV") seeking damages for alleged violation of the Unsolicited Commercial Email Act (the 
"Act"), Utah Code Ann § 13-36-101, et seq RedV has brought two motions in each of the three 
cases First, RedV moved to consolidate the three cases, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
42(a), on the basis that the three actions involve common issues of law and fact RedV's motion to 
consolidate was unopposed by Plaintiffs For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court 
grants RedV's motion to consolidate2 Pursuant to Utah R Jud Admin 4-103, disposition on all 
three cases will now be entered under case no 020413641, the lowest number assigned to the three 
cases 
Second, RedV moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted against it in each of the 
three cases, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), on the basis that the undisputed 
material facts demonstrate that RedV is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Each of RedV's 
summary judgment motions is supported by a memorandum of law and an affidavit of RedV's 
Chief Executive Officer, Gene Kavner ("Kavner") Plaintiffs have filed memoranda in opposition 
to the summary judgment motions, supported by affidavits Defendant requested oral argument on 
its summary judgment motions Plaintiffs did not request oral argument 
The only substantive difference among the cases was that two of them, Garriott and Fenn, also 
sought certification as class actions, whereas the Johnson case did not 
On April 2, 2003, Defendant filed Notices to Submit for Decision in all three cases Plaintiffs did 
not oppose the motions to consolidate The Court ruled on two of the motions (in the Fenn and 
Johnson cases), granting them, but somehow failed to act in the Garriott case Counsel for 
Defendant was requested to prepare and submit an Order reflecting consolidation, but the Order was 




The Court nas reviewed the narties"' memoranda, affidavits, and the governing law. 
Aunoim!: •* i^ ir *;vL;ie 01 juGiciai Administration 4-501(3) generally requires the Court to hear a 
dispositive motion upon a properlv-filed request by one or more of "he parties the * oar; r.mdudes 
that the governing law on these cases is clear and unambiguous and that these are not cases where 
the Court must evaluate and select between competing legal principles, Therefore, the Court 
concludes that oral argument would not materially assist it in reaching a decision. Accordingly, the 
Court denies Defendant's reouest for oral argument as unnecessary. Based upon the foregoing, the 
Court finds that the following facts are undisputed and supported by the record. 
UNDISPl JTKD MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Garriott received an unsolicited email on September 7, 2002. from sender "Norm" at 
the email address "prosperl007538w71@winniiiL a)i;i. •.. .^lipiam; Proposed Class Action. Civ. 
No. 020404285, at Exhibit A; Affidavit of Daniel Garriott ("Garriott AffT), at 3, ffi[ 4,6. The email 
Advertised R<?dV's PopupProtector™ •. ' 
2. Fenn received an unsolicited email on September 9, 2002, from "Ciiri F^-Ma!'" at 
the email address "cfm@clickformail.com." Complaint Proposed Class Action, Civ. No. 
020413641. at Exhibit A; Affidavit of Brittney Fenn ("Fenn Aff"'), at 3, ffij 4:, 6. The email 
advertised RedV's history Protector™. 
3. Johnson received an unsolicited em.*.:" • -* ^ --..-w^- *, 2: CI, :'• -1 ":;:oCv>nsumer" 
at the email address "Statt2447p00(g),prontomail.com." Complaint, Civ. No. 020404263. at Exhibit 
A; Affidavit of Jane Johnson ^lohnsoti Aff" j. at 3, •ft 4. o The email advertised RedV s 
PopupProtector™. 
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4. RedV is a Washington corporation with all rights and title to technology used to 
remove certain components from Internet programs and pop-up browser windows A ffida^  'it of 
Gene Kavner ("Kavner Aff."), at 2, % 3. RedV has incorporated, its proprietary technology ii ito a 
g i 0 ' . ; . . \ N C ! : W : ; .• ;•• . . . . . : . >.: i . .i- '•" .uLViuiwanc ^ t r ^ a : LJ ,\< . '- ~f. 
5. Through Kavner RedV assert^ that it did not directly send the challenged emails to 
Garriott, Fenn or Johnson. kawie; -•*:: . a". .• l . (J. sec also id, at. 4, * 12 (addressing Fenn case); M 
at 4, *j 11 (addressing Johnson case). In response, Plaintiffs, through their affidavits, allege that the 
unsolicited commercial emails ("UCEs") they received were "sent by or at the behest of Redmond, 
with advertising for products and promotion^ " Garrior -\ff -=: • r 4 Fcnr -\ff a; •  f-•-*• .i Vinson 
Aff,, at 3., 1| 4. Indeed, Plaintiffs' affidavits specifically assert, that each of them has '"never had any 
business or personal relations,! up v nth Defendant; nor [1 :ii:n 'e they ever] given pern lission to 
Defendant to receive emailfs] from, [Defendant] or one of [its] 'Promoters.'" Garriott. Aff. at 3, ^ 5; 
,r t il 11 n . i i.., a i ~:», [ | J , J u 11.11 ;> u i i /~\ L I a t. J!, j | J . 
6. ' RedV acknowledges that it employs contractors ("Promoters") to market its 
software.. Kavner Aff., at 2, ] [5 . However, according to the Kavner affidavit, "RedV does not 
control the day-to-day operations of its [Promoters] or the marketing methods employed by the 
[Promoters]." Id. at. 2, j^ 6; see also Agreement, at. L fflj 1(Y'}. 1(d). iuf); Agreement, at 2, ^ 6. 
RedV's Promoters are required to market software according to the "RedV Network Affiliate 
Program" ("Agreement"). Id. at 2, % 5, Promoters of RedV products are also required to agree to 
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• 
all terms of the RedV Anti-Spam. Agreement ("Spam Agreement"), which is found on the RedV 
vt*[--,it; Spam j.gjt;fcfiLiL"iL. ui i. /Agreement, at L | 1(f). 
7. Promoters market RedV's software through "one or more World Wide WTeb sites 
operated bv the Promoter, either from advertising which is located within the Promoter's software, 
or by the use of other marketing tools . . . which provide a link to RedV's server." Agreement,, at 1. 
RedV anticipates that emails and/or electronic communications will be sent promoting RedV 
products, Spam Agreement., at 1, lj 1.1. 
8. . RedV's policies specifically address the use of commercial email. Promoters must 
a g r C C IO t u111pi Y W I i11 LJ.Ic ,1 v c u v ^ 1iii-o \ )ai J.J niii cc111cii.L
 I: vv11.iu1.1 pi uHiu11;> LUC p i u1111 )11011 i >i t \ c u v 
products through UCEs. Agreement, at 1, ^ 1 (f); see also Spam Agreement, at 1, fflj 1-1.12. 
RedV's Anti-Spam policy lurther provides that each Promoter must "comply with any and all 
regulations, statutes and applicable taws related to email and/or electronic communications." Spam 
Agreement, at 2, % 1.12 nnal:\. Liie agreement makes it "the Promoter's responsibility to be awrare 
of all applicable regulations, statutes and laws." Id 
9. RedV maintains a list of its current and former Promoters and their email addresses. 
Kavner Aff, at 3, ^ 9. RedV asserts it does not have and has never had email addresses for 
"Norm," id. at 3, ^ 10, "ClickForMail" (Fenri), id. at 4, % 12, or "ProConsumer" (Johnson), id. at 4, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the undisputed facts before this Court, the Court enters the following 
Conclusions of Law7: 
Copies of the RedV Network '.f:V::ir;- ;J; ^g:^n. I L ' ; V \ L.-:. -.- ' ^ "* > .-\:;-i->pani Agreement 
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I. MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION 
1. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), "[w]hen actions involving a 
common question of law or fact are pending before the conn it may on,i"i :ill 'iia actions 
consolidated." Defendant's motion to consolidate three cases (all filed in the Sandv Department, 
involvina common issues of law7 and fact and im ;o!vn \<z the san le counsel for bora Plaintiffs and 
Defendant) is unopposed by Plaintiff. For reasons of judicial economy the Court concludes that 
consolidation of these t! i ree cases is warranted. 
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2. With respect to the summary judgment motion, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' position 
that Defendant's motions should be treated as 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss instead of as Motions 
*"*- •*.-mma:"_v . .. :j;is'jn. M-J Piamutis opposition Memoranda, at 3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56 specifically states that a party against whom a claim is asserted "may. at am time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a. summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof" 
UtahR. Civ. P. 56(b). That is precisek wh:r h :- h..rr^".ie. v ^'^uim Pi^ntu:^ uojectthat no 
discovery has taken place, none of them has filed a Rule 56(f) motion identifying specific discovery 
needed in order to respond to the present motions, ilv •_ :aa k •_ a.. k ao;:': 
3. ' The parties have filed affidavits in support of their respective positions. There are no 
material issues of fact in dispute.4 The issue for decision - whether, on these facts, Plaintiffs can 
were also filed as attachments to the Kavner Affidavit and have been reviewed by the Court. 
Although at j^ 6, infra, of the Court's Conclusions of Law, the Court notes that the parties dispute 
whether or not RedV "sent" the UCEs at issue, this Court has assumed Plaintiffs' allegations to be 
true - that is, that the individuals or entities who actually sent the UCEs are, in fact, either 
"employees7, or "independent contractors" of RedV. See infra, % 9. Thus, the factual dispute is not 
material to the resolution of this case, which resolution is premised on established legal precedent 
regarding liability of "principals" for the actions of independent contractors, and the Act's own 
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state a claim, for relief- is purely a question of law. Summary ji idgment is proper when "there is no 
genuine issue of materia! fact and the moving part?/ is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Doit, Inc. v. Touch, Ross & Co.. QO/ P " ' >?" ^— '•' 'tar !CK>; \:\ dtvie *;..: * M. i;.r '• ijgment 
motion the Court, must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to nonmoving party. Arnold 
lltiAilS,, //ix,-,. y, t -i '».'t,, ' '.. » J »i i. / i , .,— > \KJian JL,OKJJLJ. 
4. Subject matter jurisdiction has been provided by the Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-
36-1 n5. Defendant has not contested jurisdiction or venue in this Court. 
. 5. • The Act governing unsolicited commercial email establishes liability for a[e]ach 
pei son who sends or causes to be sent" a UCE, if the UCE does not meet the requirements set forth 
in the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-16-103. In this case it is undisputed that the UCEs 
received by Plaintiffs do not comply with the Act's requirements. 
• 6. ' Although Plaintiffs' affidavits assert that RedV c sent'" the I JCEs at issue in tl lese 
cases, those assertions simply cannot have been made from persona! knowledge. Affidavits 
supporting or opposing motion1 for summarv judgment must be made on. personal knowledge, 
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (citing Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1.973)); see also Strange v. Osthmd, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 
1979) (affidavits are admissible unless they are not made on personal knowledge). Moreover; these 
asseiiions are directly contradicted by Kavner's affidavit, wherein he states that RedV "did not send 
the September 7, 2002, email to Mr. Garriott. RedV does not ha\e and !ia^  nevn' hail M; Uirnntfs 
email address or any other email address listed in the email.v Kavner Aff.n at 3, % 10; see also 
Kavner Aff., at 4, \ 11 (making same ^>-;--;or v. ;o. wpect in Johnson), id JI -J ' I "' (same with 
built-in exception, to liability for actions taken by employees, if those actions are in derogation of 
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respect to Fenr., Additionally, the print-outs of the UCEs received by Plaintiffs, and attached by 
then i to tr:*:*ir ' iiiiM/in^, s;i(>\. no indication that the UCEs were sent from RedV. 
7. l-iowever. the claim that the alleged UCEs were sent "at the behest of" RedV bears 
closei scrutiny, as it potentially could subject RedV to liability under the Act if RedV cause those 
UCEs to be sent,.. Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-103. 
8. - RedV asserts that it keeps a file of all past and current Promoters, and that RedV 
does not and has never had email addresses for Norm. CiickForMa.il, oi ProConsu.- .- ka- ner Aft'. 
at 3, f^ 10; see also id., ffll 11, 12. Clearly. RedV would have the Court draw the inference that none 
of these sendee '- > ~ - - v D" 'mou/r rVv ^\L*I n^iau;} absem i.-om me amdavit is a direct, 
categorical statement that these senders are not now, nor have they ever been, Red V Promoters or 
employees. '• ' .' .- ' V . 
. 9. As noted supra, \ 3, in deciding a summary judgment motion the Coi irt draws all 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d at 725, Therefore, 
for present purposes the Court assumes that in each of these cases the actual sender • >f the a'legeJ 
UCEs is either a Rea V Promoter or a RedV employee. The question then is whether the actions of 
these Promoters or employees are srf~ -.-. -v 'r mm ^ * r ;- ,.p -v ]' -+d\ m me ba>i: that it 
"caused" the UCEs to be sent. 
10. . There are no facts before the Court to counter the kavnei Affidavit's assertion that 
Promoters are independent contractors." The Court must accept this representation. RedV then 
established company policy. See Utah Code Ann. §13-36-105(4). 
Independent contractors are distinguished from agents because principals lack the requisite control 
over independent contractors that would give rise to liability. On the other hand, "agency is the 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
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argues that it cannot be held liable for actions undertaken by independent contractors., especially 
v I'1 •:".'• -<IJS- acnor- it M*i trie- ::ir:;;;~ ~-\ *- Av^atcr^ would have been in derogation ot 1 vedV's 
established Network Affiliate and anti-Spam policies. The Court, agrees, 
,11 . . Generally, in a tort context, "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable 
for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added); see also Gleasoii v. Salt Lake 
City, 74P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937). 
12. This Court has previously noted that "[n]othing in the plain language of the Act 
appears to recogn.ze am iniut \ nu the part of the recipient of an unsolicited comni-; . ..f •- ail." 
See, e.g., Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Mindshare Design, lnc.'s Motion to Dismiss 
on } • .J -.1 *na' :• '..;.,. . -, 2 -'2*oo-;. fc _ fmrc. Di^  : j . Court, Sandy Dept., filed April 22, 
2003). Accordingly, this Court has not been "persuaded that a violation of [the Act] rises to the 
level of a tort, within the meaning of the long-arm statute." Id (citing Prince v. Bear River Mat. 
Ins., 2002 UT 68, j^ 47 ("Where a statute provides a specific civil legal remedy to redress an injury 
in violation of that statute, a tort, action for violation of the public policy embodied in the statute 
will not lie")). Nevertheless, assuming, for in- -r.W ~r. ••':.'"-,-,• *-r *•• --^ •*- .ST->f^'\ 
independent contractors was (were) actually responsible for sending the offending UCEs, and that 
si ich actions cai ised tortious inji iry to Plaintiff s, under governing precedent the Court •. ,=;u .:. ::... 
RedV would not be legally responsible for those actions, 
13. To be sure, I Itah law has recognized limited exceptions to the general rule of no 
liability to principals for actions by independent contractors. See, e.g., Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 
other shall act. on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 
74 P.2d at 1232; Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d at 326,,. However the courts have described the 
exceptions as ""narrow, arising in iat unique circumstance wiiere an employer oi an muepenuent 
conti actoi exercises enough coi lti oi O"* -ei the contracted work tc > give rise to a limited di lty of care. . 
. . . The duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the circumstances and is confined in 
scope to the control asserted."0 E.g., Thompson v. Jess. c 7 a •' 2d a; 326. 
14. In these cases, the exception does not apply because the undisputed facts are that 
"RedV does not control the day-to-day onerations of its f Promoters' or the marketing methods 
-.•mrs!- \ --d by the rPromoters]." Id. at 2, ^ 6; see also Agreement, at 1, f\\ 1(a), 1(d), 1(f).; 
Agreement, at 2. c '5 
15. * ' "• p.edV :s Spain Agreement specifically reqi tires its Promoters to agi ee 
"not to use SPAM [sic] in its promotion of RedV :s products." Spam Agreement, at 1., RedV's 
poiu : a".>v: i^qu:*-. • > * •:"..' * ' \ . : n i ; ' . v.;;. a:r. ..w ; r fv:_ .:•;.:' •:: -• **w- >r J.PTV -!^--
iaWS re ia i cu LVJ ciiiaii a n u / u i c i c o u u m u v^Oiiiinuiii^auuiiS. n 15 uifc J I Oniuici ^ i eapui lSiunu y UJ L)C 
aware of all applicable regulations, statutes and laws." Id a: 2 Whiu- I'.eciV .^  ;•.;•;:-•: .:... ; Jr':y 
does not specifically list the requirements of Utah's Act, it clearly imposes a duty on RedV's 
Promoters to know and fully comply with all of the Act's specific requirements. 
16. Furthermore, if Promoters use solicited emails to advertise RedV Products, RedV 
policy sets forth additional qualifications for those advertisements. RedV requires that its 
Promoters" ( 1 ) not send emails with misleading and/or false information, (2) include an unsubscribe 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958). 
Utah cases discussing the exceptions to the general rule of no liability for acts of independent 
contractors have uniformly involved factually-distinguishable cases where the tort of which 
plaintiffs complained resulted in physical harm to individuals. No case law has been provided to 
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link in any solicited email they send, (3) include a texi or jxsr^i/ h^w:? f ^ e : ck ^cr:1-!!! J V, hy 
the recipient is receiving the mail anu/or electronic communications-, (4) incruue where tiie recipient 
agreed to receive email and . . - ?" • —v-i *-< -^^-^ - * .ht !" *m :c: ; : :L ;> . . . . J . „;urn 
email addresses, street addresses; and (6) include the date or time the message was sent. Spam. 
Agreements, at I, %% 1.2, i 3. . V \ tv I 7 These requirements are consistent with the provisions of 
Utah's Act. . . 
17. The Court concludes that even if the individuals or entities that sent Plaintiffs the 
offending UCEs are (or were) RedV Promoters, RedV itself cannot be held liable under the Act on 
the theory that RedV ^caused' those UCEs to be sent. If sent by RedV Promoters, the actions of 
those alleged Promoters were clearly unauthorized under the explicit terms of RedV" s policies. 
18. The Court's conclusion is bolstered by the Act's plain language, which creates an 
exception to liability for i insolicited emails sent by an entity"1 s employees: ""7 he violation of Section 
13-36-103 by an employee does not subject the employee's employer to liability under that section 
if the eir^-'^'-'V <^1: ^ *• • I •- 3 •> ui.v ;... : o: ,.n e^aon^^a poiie\ . ; the 
employer that requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-103." Utah Code Aim. 
§13-36-105'4) (Supp 2002). KedYks agreements with its Promoters outline the established policies 
of the company with respect to how7 marketing of RedV products may, and may not, be condiicted. 
Those established policies expressly require RedV representatives to comply with all the particulars 
of state anti-spam laws. Thus, if any employee's unauthor^o- ir-V.*. ^.- '* •<.,/.* . - P V 
liability under the Act for actions taken in derogation of its company's established policy, then 
the Court suggesting that principals may be held liable for acts of independent contractors in 
situations where no physical harm has resulted. 
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similar unauthorized actions by independent contractors cannot be construed to create liability for 
RedV 
19. As a final matter, the Court notes that Garriott's Complaint, filed DecemDer i7, 
2002, did not include a Trespass to Chattels claim Further, Garriott has not moved the Court for 
leave to amend his Complaint to include such a claim However, in his April 7, 2003, Opposition to 
Defendant's motion, Garriott, for the first time, included such a claim The Court concludes that 
Garriott's Trespass to Chattels is not properly before the Court and therefore the Court declines to 
address it 
ORDER 
Accordingly, for the above reasons and as set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Consolidate and Motion for Summary Judgment, dated June 25, 
2003, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
1. RedV s Motion for Consolidation is GRANTED, 
2. Disposition of the three cases will be consolidated under Case No 0204136^1, 
3. Defendants' request for oral argument on their Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED, 
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4. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
DATED this ^ ^ H a y of July, 2003 
BY THE COURT 
Judge DeniseP Lindtferg 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
and 
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES, P C 
Denver C Snuffer, Jr 
Jesse L Riddle 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2003,1 caused one true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be sent, first class postage prepaid, to the following 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Jesse L Riddle 
RIDDLE & ASSOCIATES, PC. 
11778 South Election Drive, Suite 240 
Draper, UT 84020-6808 
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